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INCREASING EUPOPULISM AS A MEGATREND IN EAST 




Brexit and Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 US presidential election has launched a wave of discussions 
in the international media and political science literature on “authoritarian populism” and a “populist 
explosion.” Although this paper also reflects on this new wave of populism in the West, it concentrates on 
the connections between democracy’s decline and the so-called populist explosion in eastern central Europe 
(ECE) and closely investigates the Hungarian case within the context of ECE. This paper describes 
populism in ECE as a product of the transition from fading facade democracies to emerging velvet 
dictatorships. These velvet dictatorships rely on the soft power of media and communication rather on the 
hard power of state violence. Paradoxically, the ruling anti-elite populist parties have developed a system 
of populism from above, managed by the new politico-business elite. Populism (social and national) and 
Euroscepticism are the two most basic, and twin, terms used to describe these new (semi)authoritarian 
regimes. Populism and Euroscepticism are convertible; they are two sides of the same coin as they express 
the same divergence from the EU mainstream. Therefore, this paper introduces the term: Eupopulism.
Key words: decline of democracy, comparative ECE populism, three periods and types of populism
INTRODUCTION: INCREASING EUPOPULISM AS A MEGATREND IN EAST 
CENTRAL EUROPE 
Populism’s many faces change within different socio-political environments, therefore it is 
very difficult to give a comprehensive definition of populism. All approaches to populism, 
however, converge at a general condition for populism: two homogeneous and antagonistic 
groups—the “pure” people and the “corrupt” elite—face off in a political contest based on this 
people-versus-elite dichotomy. In this Manichaean vision of society, a decision-making shortcut 
between the people and the elite emerges in the form of a charismatic and honest leader, who 
with sizeable popular support, makes all decisions—eliminating the need for the intermediary 
institutions as the general will of the people is evident. Populism is messianic, the charismatic 
leader offers salvation to the people by defeating society’s internal and external so-called 
enemies. “Although vague and ill-defined, the concept of ‘populism’ does a better job than 
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any other currently circulating well-defined concepts of capturing the nature of the challenges 
facing liberal democracy today.” (Smilov and Krastev, 2008, p.7). Thus, there is a paradox in the 
academic research: despite the large amount of literature on populism, content on populism’s 
nature is missing or minimal. Because populism is a thin and eclectic ideology, it can easily be 
combined with thicker ideological counterparts such as conservatism, liberalism, and socialism.1
Populist parties can be analysed more deeply by examining the contrasts between responsive 
and responsible parties, between short-term and long-term approaches, and between direct 
political action and strategic vision (Bardi et. al, 2014). Actually, according to the seminal work of 
Mény and Surel (2002), populism is a pathology of representative democracy because populism 
always reveals the primary national and regional deficiencies of a representative democracy. 
As most studies mention, populism is difficult to conceptualize because its varieties depends 
on context, time, and local conditions.2
As populism has a different form for every period of democratic malaise and a face specific 
to different countries, regions, and continents, and as the definitions and descriptions of 
populism as a pathology hinge on the standards of democracy in a given period and reflect the 
features of a particular country or region, this paper—though it relies on mainstream literature 
on populism—deals only with populism particular to ECE.3
Populism has been a megatrend in eastern central Europe since the onset of systemic 
changes in the region in 1989. Populism has been, to some extent, an endemic feature of all 
parties in the region—including the mainstream parties—and reached its peak in the populism-
from-above of the currently ruling parties. The basic statement of this paper is that the main 
reason behind ECE’s populism is the region’s failure to catch up to the West and “return to 
Europe.” This unsuccessful attempt to achieve the so-called central European dream (Darvas, 
2014) has defined the region’s last quarter century. In reaction to the global crisis, “countries like 
Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and [the] Czech Republic appeared to take a ‘populist turn’ . . . the 
incidents of threats to the EU’s democratic principles and values has increased” (EPC Discussion 
Paper, Balfour and Stratulat, 2012, p. 2). Hence, the populist drug has been instrumental to the 
ECE’s survival of a long triple-crisis and to bridging the gap between unrealistic expectations 
1  As Richard Youngs indicates, we have to “reframe the debate on populism” after its victory in the United 
Kingdom and United States. On the new wave, see Judis (2016a,b) and Mishra (2016). There have also been 
two waves of politics of memory in the West, first Patterson and Monroe (1998) and Winter (1998), and second, 
Lebow et. al. (eds) (2006), Mark (2010) and Blacker et al.(2013).
2  From the massive collection of Western mainstream literature on populism, see Barr (2009), Chwalisz (2015), 
Degan-Krause and Haughton (2009), Giusto et al. (2013), Haughton (2014), Herman (2015), Kessels (2015), Krastev 
(2007), Kriesi (2014), Kriesi and Pappas (2015), Laclau (2007), Ladrech (2014), Lewis (2014), Mair (2002), Mény 
and Surel (2002), Mudde (2002,2007), Painter (2013), Pytlas (2016), Rupnik (2007a,b), Wolinetz and Zaslove 
(2016), and Woods (2014). The academic history of populism since the late 1960s has been presented by Pappas 
(2015). For international literature on ECE, and on populist parties, see Cabada et al. (2014), Casal Bértoa (2012), 
Gherghina (2014), Haughton (2014), Kopecky et al. (2012), Lewis (2014), and Sedelmeier (2014).
3  The populist drive has been stronger in ECE than in the Baltic states, since the latter have been much more 
internationally competitive, as indicated by ranking institutes like Bertelsmann and others. The Baltic states have 
not suffered from a decline in democracy to that extent that ECE’s states have. Unlike ECE’s states, the Baltic 
states still stand a reasonable chance of integrating into the European core. Thus, this paper deals only with 
five ECE states and focuses on the Hungarian case, which has been regarded as the worst case by international 
political scientists and the media (BF, 2016a,b).
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and the region’s worsening realities. ECE’s populism has been an international and domestic 
product of at least two of the West’s fallacies: 1) that traveling the road to the West would be 
an easy journey; and 2) that ECE’s states would rise from Soviet repression ready to become 
European overnight with the same ease that Sleeping Beauty awoke from the witch’s spell.4
Populism may be an important feature of the party system in the West, but it has been 
much more influential in eastern central Europe where there has been a megatrend in party 
development due to ECE’s populations’ high and unmet expectations. In fact, eastern central 
Europe was a semi-periphery of western Europe for centuries and, after regaining independence 
from Soviet repression, the region has indeed “returned to Europe,” but only with a new form 
of semi-peripheral status. Increasing populism in ECE is the political price the region has paid 
for its transition from socialism to various forms of semi-western market economies and formal-
legal macro-democracies. Thus, this paper will not engage in a discussion on the definition of 
populism in general, but it will pursue the specificities of populism in ECE. This paper contributes 
to the rich academic literature on populism in ECE by both widening the topic first to the ECE’s 
general features based on the region’s common historical trajectory, and by narrowing the 
topic later to describe the successive stages and types populism.
Of course, populism is not a new phenomenon in ECE, populism has a long history in 
the region and its path, characteristically, includes many forms of populist movements and 
narratives. ECE’s populism—or the populism of individual countries in ECE—is an organic 
extension of traditional forms of populism from the region’s former periods. The region’s 
historical turning point occurred around the late 1980s and early 1990s. The collapse of the 
bipolar world rendered systemic change in the region that were so drastic a new kind of populism 
was born. A new period of hopes and expectations began and the path dependence motives 
returned with a vengeance. I will discuss this return-to-history scenario, in lieu of a return-to-
Europe scenario, as the re-emergence of a traditional narrative articulated in the region’s new 
situation. The path dependence motives, however, just scratch the surface in reframing this 
narrative as a freedom fight against the EU (Orbán, 2016), which is evident in the absolutely 
new approach of confrontational, anti-EU, hard populism.
Finally, ECE’s case demonstrates how populism traditionalizes an anti-EU narrative with 
soft power by manipulating the masses with simplistic traditionalizing narratives—the main 
weapons of populist parties and actors, both oppositional and in government. The populist 
parties in ECE are often prisoners of history, they use the politics of historical memory as their 
main ideological weapon in domestic politics. After the so-called illiberal turn (Rupnik, 2012), 
the newly emerging velvet dictatorships have been modernized. Hence, as Smilov and Krastev 
point out, instead of using physical violence, their main instrument of repression is the capture 
and abuse of soft-power: “There are certain long-term changes in the political process, which 
4  This paper follows my recent publications on ECE (Ágh, 2015a,b, 2016a,b). I do not deal here with the socio-
economic causes of increasing populism, I have written a series of papers on the triple crisis (transformation crisis 
in 1990s, post-accession crisis in 2000s and global crisis in 2010s) and ECE’s failures in the  catching-up process 
in socio-economic and competitiveness terms (see Ágh 2015c). Data on the general impoverishment in ECE due 
to the global crisis are available in IMF (2014, 2016) and ILO (2016). The democratic malaise in ECE can also be 
seen in Pew survey results (2009, 2014, 2016).
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seem to facilitate the spread of populism. First, politics has become much more media-centred 
and personalized. The importance of loyalty to ideas and programs is diminishing . . . Populist 
parties, with their focus on communications and personalities, are much better suited for such 
an environment, than ‘traditional’ parties . . . it has almost made the concept of [a] ‘party 
program’ devoid of meaning” (2008, p. 10).
Even democracy itself has been included in the simplistic traditionalizing narratives 
incumbent ECE governments frequently abuse. The ruling politico-business elites have narrowly 
defined democracy as a government with free elections, despite the fact that the most recent 
elections in Hungary, in 2014, may have been free, but they were certainly not fair. At every 
step of the decision-making process, ECE’s governments seem to argue, “We are entitled to 
make this decision because we won the election and this is a democracy.” Therefore, ECE’s 
populations are understandably suspicious of democracy and may be thinking, “If this system 
of governance is democracy, I don’t like it.” It is no wonder that ECE’s populations have serious 
reservations about their experiences with such so-called democracies. These formal, electoral 
democracies, instead of have becoming substantial liberal democracies, have turned into 
facades of democracy.5
1. SOFT AND HARD POPULISM: PERIODS AND TYPES OF POPULISM IN ECE
ECE’s populism departs from general populism’s people-versus-elite dichotomy and Manichaean 
approach to political contestation in a manner specific to the region’s historical trajectory and 
to the emergence of ECE’s facade democracies over the last quarter-century. The issue most 
specific to populism in ECE is the merging of political elites and business elites that resulted in 
a drastic reduction in the number of political actors, a narrowing of the very sphere of politics, 
oligarchization, and state capture. Accordingly, there are three forms and periods of populism 
in ECE—shy, soft, and hard-populism—following the reduction of politics. And there are three 
main types of populism, marginal, business-centred, and the politics-centred, which follow 
specific forms of oligarchization in a given country in ECE.
I apply the term shy populism to describe the ECE’s first period of populism in the 1990s 
when a naïve optimism dominated public discourse and populism was weak and marginal. The 
distinction between soft and hard populism in ECE dates back to the 2000s. “Soft populism is 
the challenge to the existing system of representation and mainly to existing party system . . 
. Hard populism is characterized by more severe threats to the constitutional framework: it 
challenges not only the existing structure of representation but also some of the fundamental 
principles of liberal democracy such as the protection of individual and minority rights, etc,” 
(Smilov and Krastev, 2008, p. 9). Usually, the dividing line between soft and hard populism is 
rather fluid, the ECE’s parties move back and forth across the grey zone between populist and 
non-populist actions. Hence in general, all parties are populist to some extent.6
5  The Journal of Democracy has published a series of special issues on democratic backsliding , see 27(1), 
January 2016. The term free but not fair has been used to describe elections by experts (see Mudde, 2014), and 
also by official institutions, such as the Council of Europe (Muiznieks, 2014) and OSCE (2014).
6  I do not deal here with the early form of shy, marginal, and weak populism in the 1990s, when there was 
still belief in an upcoming horn of plenty, since the deviation from the EU mainstream basically began in the late 
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Before the global economic crisis, there was a wide range of grey, in-between positions 
instead of polar cases. But after the crisis, there have been clear, classic moves from soft to 
hard populism. Thus, soft and hard populism have to be distinguished not only analytically, 
but also historically. Soft populism emerged with its deep people-versus-elite dichotomy 
due to the narrowing of the political arena. This reduction in politics was due to the socio-
economically based exclusion of the masses from politics, which also led to partocracy. Finally, 
the emergence of hard populism—in the region’s third period of populism—and the rise of an 
aggressive populist elite is strongly connected to the protracted global economic crisis, which 
contributed to the people’s deep dissatisfaction with an impotent political elite. In the Polish 
and Hungarian cases, hard populism has appeared in its classic form in response to the global 
economic crisis; whereas in the Czech and Slovak cases, soft populism didn’t harden until the 
2010s. Altogether, since the early 2010s, mainstream analysts have pointed out a common 
tendency towards populism in ECE, a populism that shares a common essence but varies by 
individual country (EPC, 2012; EPC, 2016).7
These three periods of populism have been closely connected with the types of populism in 
ECE. Abby Innes’s analysis of the various types of populism in ECE contributes to descriptions of 
the present period of populism. Specifically, Innes identifies two types of political developments 
in ECE. In a corporate state capture, economic motivations dominate and powerful corporations 
and almighty oligarchs appear on the political scene rather directly—as they did in the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia—and produce business-centred populism. In this model, neither 
party politicians nor oligarchs endeavour to make long-term ideological changes to the state 
machinery as an expression of their values and expectations, but instead strive to institute 
short-term, rent- or profit-seeking changes driven to the fore by business oligarchs active on 
the political scene. In Innes’s opposite model, party state capture, political motivations drive 
the new elite. In this scenario, parties want long-term control of state machinery in order 
to transform the state according to their values and expectations. Poland and Hungary have 
produced politics-centred populism. In Slovakia, the ruling Social Democratic party, Smer-SD, 
tried to build a closer version of the “political” populism, but this attempt failed at the March 
2016 elections. In this model, oligarchs are less prominent and less likely to play direct political 
roles, but they enjoy the privileges of state capture nevertheless. Rent- or profit-seeking drives 
appear first in domination over the state. Therefore, “the EU’s leverage is necessarily limited 
in the cases of party state capture” (Innes, 2014, p. 101).
In my view, the common denominator shared by party state captures and corporate state 
captures is democracy capture, which occurs when the dominant parties in the hegemonic 
1990s with soft- and hard-populism. I have analysed the ECE countries here using the term facade democracy, 
which has been widely used in international political science, and I have introduced the term Golem parties to 
describe political organizations that extend into or capture large parts of the economy and the media.
7  Increasing populism in ECE has been analysed extensively, see Meseznikov et al. (2008), in which the authors 
treat ECE’s populism as a region-specific political issue, rather different from that of other regions and continents. 
There are some recent papers on the populism written by Bugaric (2008) and Enyedi (2015, 2016a,b). The Policy 
Solutions Institute has also published a general report on ECE (2015). Bertelsmann’s report on the Czech Republic 
(pp. 2,4) points out that “the increasing public disenchantment with political parties” leads to “the fluidity of party 
system.” The report describes President Zeman as the main figure of populist politics. See also, Klíma (2015).
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party system abuse their majority to legally transform the democratic polity into a facade 
democracy. This democracy capture has recently appeared in ECE as a form of populism from 
above. In these appearances, strong elite rulers transform the basic social, economic, and 
political structures and colonize civil society in a “society capture.” The current governments 
in ECE have been based on tight networks formed by a joint politico-business elite, a privileged 
political class with tough party discipline and high incomes.  These joint politico-business elites 
have organized statocracies. The statocracizing of populist democracy has been based on nativist 
state capitalism, state capitalism combined with a parasitic national capitalism created by 
drastically intervening with the market economy. There have been many detailed analyses on 
the oligarchization of market economies and emerging negative informal institutions comprising 
a large clientele for joint political and business networks, resulting in the uncontested rule of a 
power-hungry politico-business elite. This nationalist anti-elite ideology, in fact, represents and 
defends its own elite rule with unlimited power, as checks and balances have been reduced to 
a mere facade. There has been a wide variety of populist parties and movements, populism has 
increased in all countries in ECE. All in all, populism has been a megatrend in ECE, accompanied 
by its twin process, Euroscepticism.8
In general, the deepening socio-economic crisis has led to “populist polarization” in ECE 
(Enyedi, 2016a,b). One objective of populism is to provide a strong, charismatic leader with 
unquestionable authority with an enemy—the incumbent elite or foreigners—for political 
exploitation in black-and-white populist narratives. ECE’s countries’ failure to catch up in the EU 
has become clearer given global crisis management in these countries and has been the driving 
force of populism nowadays. Consequently, serious conflicts between the EU and domestic 
ruling populist elites in ECE have surfaced. Hence, the new politico-business elites have found 
images of an enemy inside the country and also outside the country: the EU. Again, populism 
and Euroscepticism are twin phenomena, since it is particularly true in ECE that “populists can 
easily project these problems onto ‘Europe,’ which in this case merely represents fear of the 
outside world in general . . . What has taken the form of an anti-EU vote constitutes in reality a 
protest against socio-economic problems at home“ (Gros, 2014, pp. 2-3). Populism has emerged 
basically, although not exclusively, as Eupopulism, an anti-EU movement and mentality: “On 
both sides, an increasing national focus and a rise in populism as well as anti-EU sentiment are 
evident in all parts of society. The EU is more and more perceived as a problem. The weakest 
hold that the EU, and especially core countries in the euro zone, are imposing too much on 
them and asking too much from them.” (Emmanouilidis, 2011, p. 13).
As usual, the ruling populist parties try to divert the political agenda from vital socio-
economic issues to nationalist-nativist narratives about refugees and international conspiracy 
theories. Above all, the populist governments thrive on international crises, times when it is 
8  Policy Solutions (2015, pp. 26-30) counters that in 2014 and 2015 support for populist parties increased and 
explicitly named ECE’s relevant populist parties: HU 72% (Fidesz and Jobbik); CZ 48.2% (Czech Communist Party, 
Party of Free Citizens, Dawn-National Coalition, Freedom and Direct Democracy, and ANO 2011); PL 51.18% 
(Law and Justice, Congress of the New Right, Kukiz, Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic), SK 7.1% (Slovak 
National Party, but Smer is not included).
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easy to find enemies. Recently, new issues have come up such as anti-refugee rhetoric in a 
campaign allegedly defending a country—or sometimes more generally, Europe as a whole—
from Muslim arch-enemies or from inevitable invasions due to the declining West’s inability 
to protect a country or Europe. It proves that, even in the present period, the governments in 
ECE have been successful in getting popular support by opening or closing new issue niches, by 
entering issue niches into the political arena or by supporting niche actors with the ownership 
of resonant frames.9 Lubomir Zaorálek, the Czech minister of foreign affairs rightly notes:
In today’s jarred climate, no member state is immune to the temptations of inward-looking 
populism, though it may feed off different sources and manifest itself in different forms. In 
Central Europe, the legacy of communist rule casts a long shadow— but so do the mistakes 
of the transition period, with its overreliance on technocratic modes of change, often at the 
expense of social cohesion, inclusive development and democratic accountability. It has left 
too many of our citizens on the losing side of economic transformation, alienated from what 
they perceive as a closed system shot through with corruption. In today’s time of distress 
and uncertainty, past failures are coming back to haunt us, empowering far-right extremists, 
polarizing our societies and undermining trust in Europe’s liberal order” (2016, p. 2).
In the political turmoil in east central Europe, populists often win elections easily by 
mobilizing public support with simplistic populist slogans. The people, enchanted by messianic 
populist appeals, distance themselves from parties that do not use populist slogans. A closer 
analysis of the periods and types of populism in ECE leads to a discussion of the weak and 
volatile party systems in ECE; Eupopulism as a megatrend has penetrated the political system 
as a whole in ECE, although it characterizes the ECE countries to different extents and in various 
ways. This common populist disease can be seen in oppositions to the EU mainstream in the 
refugee crisis, such as the V4 Prague Declaration (2015).
2. CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND VICTORIOUS POPULIST-PROTEST PARTIES IN ECE
The countries in ECE had not fully completed their process of adjusting to EU membership 
when the global economic crisis struck.  Because the crisis closely followed their EU accessions, 
the global crisis hit ECE’s countries harder.  There, the crisis provoked popular dissatisfaction, 
giving populist parties an edge in ECE. In the last decade, increasing populism has also led 
to the rise of Eurosceptic parties. In the three European Parliament (EP) elections held in 
ECE—in 2004, 2009, and 2014—five countries in ECE sent a total of forty-three parties to 
EP seats. ECE’s representation of mainstream party members in the European Parliament 
(MEPs) is relatively small, only about half (123 of 237)mainstream MEPS hail from ECE. 
These numbers reveal a tsunami of small populist-protest parties winning EP elections and 
clearly show a Eupopulism trend. The basic issue, from a bird’s-eye view of ECE’s historical 
9  The protracted social crisis has created a high level of xenophobia in ECE. Two Hungarian institutes, Political 
Capital (see www.politicalcapital.hu) and Policy Solutions (see www.policysolutions.hu), have been deeply involved 
in international research on DEREX (Demand for Right-Wing Extremism, see www.derexindex.eu) and published 
many papers on extreme-right parties, including Jobbik.
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trajectory is the decreasing popularity of political elites and low participation in elections 
with very high party volatility.10
The West’s usual typologies of parties and party systems do not work in ECE, and a formal-
legal approach to the region’s narrow political history does not help either, since the historical 
trajectory of countries in ECE has been determined to a great extent by the socio-economic 
history of the region. It is important to identify the special role parties and party systems 
have played in ECE during its quarter-century of systemic changes. After the first decade of 
EU membership, countries in ECE had still not effectively institutionalized parties as the main 
actors of both representative and participative democracy. All of the eastern central European 
countries’ formal-legal institutions have been built like sand palaces—without solid social 
backing or patterns of civic culture. When these countries failed to achieve unrealistically high 
expectations, of some kind of welfare society, national-social populism offered the population 
a mirage of a new age and ideological drugs as recompensation. Thus, in ECE, the population’s 
perceived reality differs very much from the genuine socio-economic reality, and this contrast 
between dream and actuality grew during the region’s first decade of EU membership. In the 
EU, a deep democratic malaise has appeared in both the so-called East and in the West, but in 
very different ways. ECE has been haunted by the nightmarish and increasing gap between the 
core and the periphery and by the threat of deepening peripherialization. Hence, the region’s 
disappointment over not being able to easily and rapidly catch up during the global crisis has 
led to much deeper democratic malaise in ECE than in the West.
EU membership in ECE brought a series of achievements, but it also caused region-specific 
negative externalities. First of all, the eastern enlargement developed dependency by closely 
integrating ECE’s production structures to the West. The East has become an economic 
semi-periphery of the near West, especially of Germany and Austria (Galgóczi, 2016). This 
semi-peripheral status has produced marked underdevelopment by creating islands of poverty 
within eastern central Europe’s countries. The countries are deeply divided internally between 
their developing, modern regions and their backward, declining regions. A crucial issue for 
ECE is internal and territorial social cohesion; these countries need to be closely integrated 
not only with the EU, but also to unite their own modernized and backward regions. The rise 
of national-social populism as a megatrend in ECE is based on deepening social-vertical and 
national-horizontal splits within ECE. Simply put, ECE’s democratic malaise has been caused 
by the profound social malaise of the last quarter-century.11
Thus, in the new political geography, ECE’s countries have been splitting into two groups: 
the west of the East and the east of the East. The former achieved some kind of western 
10  I provide only a rough estimation, since it is rather difficult both to identify the long-term mainstream parties 
in ECE—given that there has been a drastic change among the leading parties—and to qualify the short-term, 
smaller parties getting EP seats. Yet, this changing party landscape shows the fragility of the EP’s representation 
of mainstream parties and the relatively large representation of changing, smaller populist parties.
11  Many policy institutes—Bertelsmann (2016a,b), European Catching Up Index (2014) and FH, 2016—have 
analysed this contrast between the formal and substantive democratization in ECE. Ten years of EU membership 
has been evaluated in the introduction of Rupnik and Zielonka ‘s work (2013). See also Banac (2014). There 
are also some analyses emphasizing the lack of participatory democracy in ECE, see the chapter by Cabada in 
Demetriou (2013), and see Bugaric (2008).
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development, and relatively speaking, is catching up.  The latter group, however, has absolutely 
declined. The east of the East has lost its competitiveness, experienced high unemployment, 
and witnessed a worsening standard of living. Furthermore, national statistics relate wide 
territorial polarization there. Therefore, a distinction is needed to identify the relative and 
fragile—precarious—satisfaction of ECE’s populations in the west of the East and the deep 
dissatisfaction of eastern central Europe’s populations in the east of the East. Nonetheless, 
given this political geography, the general disappointment of ECE’s populations after ten years 
of EU membership has determined domestic party landscapes. This basic domestic territorial 
and social divergence has also been responsible for the distinctions between the soft and hard 
social movements, parties, and ideologies in the west of the East versus those of the east of the 
East within ECE’s countries. These differences can be easily detected on the countries’ electoral 
maps through the varieties of populism and Euroscepticism at national and EP elections. The 
hard populist and Eurosceptic parties have found popular support in the east of the East among 
the region’s so-called absolute losers, the unemployed. The soft populist and Eurosceptic parties 
in the west of the East are supported by the so-called relative losers: the declassed middle 
strata. This can be seen best on the electoral maps of Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia, which 
are completely partitioned between East and West. All in all, due to the global crisis, ECE’s 
populations have generally been living in a state of permanent insecurity in these precarious 
countries and there is an increasingly real precariate class or strata in the middle (ILO, 2016).
Actually, to discover the secret history of ECE, one has to identify the political actors and 
define the parties and party systems in ECE in a manner that diverges from the standard 
definitions in the West. This history can be described as a negative tendency towards the 
emergence of Golem parties in hegemonic party systems. These strong parties have been the 
most relevant actors in the young, declining democracies in the last quarter-century of ECE’s 
history. The particular features of the parties, and their hegemonic party systems dominated 
by the strongest—by Golem parties—have structured political and social life as a whole. They 
have appeared in different ways in ECE’s countries as dominant actors of party landscapes. 
The biggest eastern central European parties, as monopolistic political actors, have become 
almighty, comprehensive social actors with large, strong, informal networks. These parties have 
also embraced the economy and media in a close merger between politics and business (see 
Rupnik and Zielonka, 2013). Golem parties have created well-working country-size corruption 
networks based on public procurement and EU transfers. In this way, Golem parties have to 
a great extent controlled paralysed societies. Moreover, in systems of crony capitalism (The 
Economist, 2014a), Golem parties have organized their own special pseudo-civil society from 
above as well as a domestication of civil society. The social embeddedness of all of ECE’s parties 
has been very weak, hence socially and ideologically “unanchored political elites” have emerged 
and been controlled, to a great extent, by business oligarchs (Herman, 2015).
The large formal institutions—including parties as far as membership and relations to 
civil society and its organizations is concerned—have been organized without social support 
and participation. Therefore, paradoxically, the most institutionalized party systems are the 
most unstable. As Golem parties neglect support of their membership more and more, the 
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formal stabilization of party systems into huge parties actually means the cumulative social 
destabilization of party-political systems in ECE. From the outside, party hegemons or Golem 
parties look like big, strong, well-organized parties; in fact, they are cadre parties appointing 
only loyal followers to public posts and they lose public support at critical elections due to 
undelivered promises and high levels of corruption. In general, there has been an increasing 
alienation of the common people from the world of political promises and a growing lack 
of confidence in public institutions, parties, parliaments, and governments. As a result, due 
to cumulated social tensions, new parties appear abruptly in the old party systems. These 
critical parties—as deviations from mainstream parties—now represent a political reaction 
to the management of the global economic crisis, they express the masses’ suffering from 
the full, long-term effects of a triple crisis. The low levels of trust in the new democratic 
institutions—and above all in the parties—have generated their long-standing, cumulative 
negative effects.12
Although populists usually appeal to “the people” as a whole, as opposed to the corrupt 
and impotent elites, the populist parties do not appear only in oppositional roles. Populists 
offer an alternative to representative democracy in the form of strong-handed majoritarian 
rule and they propagate the belief that supporting the majority at elections gives government 
a free hand in decision-making. Therefore, populists oppose minority rights and interest 
intermediation. Paradoxically, populism, as an anti-elite movement and ideology, tries to 
establish an exclusive elite rule with a strong leader and a disempowered population. Populist 
parties and leaders refer to the people’s opposition against an impotent and corrupt elite, 
but actually they want to become the new elite and consolidate a new elite position. Thus, 
“central European populism is a longing for new elites.” (Smilov and Krastev, 2008, p. 10). Since 
populist parties also attract some traditional left-wing voters during periods of austerity, they 
have been very successful in ECE in gaining power with large-scale victories and have formed 
a new political elite.
From the late 2000s onward, the outbursts of populist protest and the rise of anomic 
movements have, more and more, taken the form of demonstrations led by extreme-right 
organizations. This negative tendency reached its peak in the 2010s with the emergence of all 
sorts of populist and extremist organizations and the volcanic appearance of protest parties. 
In the 2010s, the socio-economic shock of the global crisis contributed to a prolonged party-
political crisis in ECE with these Golem-type parties. Under the pressure of crisis management 
the first party system eroded in the 2000s and due to the large popular dissatisfaction, it finally 
collapsed in the 2010s. But efforts to organize hegemonic, Golem parties have continued after 
ECE’s critical elections, and the new, second party system emerged. This recent political crisis has 
been based on the worsening social crisis—impoverishment and social exclusion has led to social 
populism—from below and has culminated in the deepening identity crisis—renationalization 
12  The rankings of public trust in politicians in ECE are among the worst globally (of 144 countries): CZ: 138, HU: 
113, PL: 101, SI: 133 and SK: 121 (WEF, 2015: 409). Accordingly, there was very low turnout in ECE at the 2004, 
2009, and 2014 EP elections, the participation was 27.9-28.2-18.2; 38.4-36.2-28.9; 20.8-24.5-23.8; 28.3-28.3-20.9 
and 16.9-19.6-13.0 per cent in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia respectively.
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and xenophobia leading to national populism—from above. Indeed, the political science on 
ECE’s party developments is a dismal science as this short overview of ECE’s party systems 
clearly demonstrates.13
3. THE WORST CASE SCENARIO: THE HUNGARIAN DISEASE OR POPULISM  
FROM ABOVE
This course from aggressive opposition to a newly entrenched political elite is clearly 
demonstrated by the Hungarian case, in Hungary the global crisis led to a complete populist 
victory during the second and third Orbán governments. Hungary has been a worst case scenario, 
not only in illustrating democracy’s decline in general, but particularly in establishing an enduring 
and fake populist democracy. Hungary’s socio-economic crisis caused lagging confidence in the 
political elite and the mainstream’s lack of trust in Hungary’s democratic parties when these 
parties proved they were unable to manage neither the situation nor the global crisis and failed 
to deliver on their promises. Accordingly, Hungary’s triple crisis brought three populist waves 
in Hungary. In the first period, in the 1990s, the transformation crisis produced widespread 
social shock and dissatisfaction with the new democracy, which—in the early years—resulted 
in only shy or marginal populism in Hungary. However, by the second period, at the end of the 
decade, Hungary’s failure to achieve unrealistically high expectations brought the first Orbán 
government to power, resulting in an authoritarian attempt at light or soft populism. Because 
Orbán formed a coalition government, that from 1998 to 2002, had only a relative majority 
with limited power, he could not transform the constitutional order. In the 2000s, however, the 
post-accession crisis contributed to a much larger populist mobilization during the Socialist-
Liberal coalition governments of 2002 to 2010. Fidesz was in opposition, but this stage of 
populist mass mobilization was a very important preparation period for a complete populist 
takeover orchestrated through both social referendum, street violence, and the organization 
of so-called civil circles as mobilization devices directed against the incumbent government.14
In the late 2000s, due to post-accession and the onset of the global economic crisis, 
Hungary’s large, formally well-institutionalized, but socially weak, democratic parties collapsed. 
Thus, Hungary demonstrated clearly the ECE paradox: the most institutionalized party systems 
become the most destabilized political systems. On this period, Renata Uitz notes: “What 
makes the Hungarian case interesting is that populist devices are not used by newcomers or 
fringe parties to mobilize support in order to gain entry to mainstream politics. Rather, in the 
present day Hungary populist rhetoric is a means of communication for a large parliamentary 
party which resorts to this instrument not simply as a campaign device but also as a technique 
replacing—at least at one level of communication—the usual arsenal of opposition in everyday 
13  The cases of politics-centred hard populism in Poland and Hungary are parallel developments according to 
the international media. See the discussion on the Orbán-Kaczynski meeting and of a counter-cultural revolution 
against old Europe in The Financial Times (Foy and Buckley, 2016), or see Pytlas (2016) on Polish populism. I 
recently dealt with the parallel developments in Poland and Hungary (Ágh, 2016c,d).
14  Here I summarize briefly the Hungarian developments. It is not by chance that Pappas (2014, 2015) has 
made a parallel analysis of the Hungarian and Greek populism, both cases are outstanding. As I have mentioned 
in my former papers, many analysts consider Hungary the worst case of populism in ECE.
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parliamentary parties” (Uitz, 2008, p. 69). In this decade of aggressive populist mobilization, 
Fidesz—as an allegedly centre-right party—embraced and supported Jobbik by absorbing the 
narratives and slogans of the extreme right. Characteristically, Viktor Orbán and Gábor Vona, 
the presidents of Fidesz and Jobbik, come from the same cradle, from the same civil circle of 
populist organizations of the 2000s.15
As a result, in the third period, the velvet dictatorship has emerged as a full-fledged, 
hard-populist democracy. Nowadays, Hungary has a quasi one-party system, and as Fidesz has 
over-institutionalized, its party institutions are almost direct state and government institutions. 
All of Hungary’s other parties are weak and hardly institutionalized at all. The turning point for 
Hungarian populism occurred in 2010 when Fidesz received a two-thirds supermajority and 
the second Orbán government ruined democratic and constitutional checks and balances. 
This historical turning point can be modelled according to distinctions between soft and hard 
populism. Usually, the dividing line between soft and hard populism in ECE is rather fluid, but 
this transition between the second and third waves of populism in Hungary in 2010 destroyed 
the liberal democracy. Because Hungary experienced the region’s deepest social crisis, which 
resulted in the largest populist victory in ECE, the Hungarian case demonstrates the strongest 
populist course to power. Fidesz controls a large part of the economy through voluntarist 
legislation and by increasing state property, Fidesz also controls the economy by wielding 
hard political power and by using soft power in the media. Orbán—and the Fidesz regime in 
general—claim to be centre-right national-conservatives, but these terms do not fit Orbán or 
his regime. In fact, centre-right conservatives, preferring some kind of the West’s Christian-
democratic line, were shocked by Orbán’s second government in 2010. These centre-right 
conservatives, referred to in the Hungarian media as “orphaned conservatives” (Lantos, 2011), 
turned more and more against the Orbán regime before they finally publicly denounced Orbán’s 
populism (Dull, 2016).16
The Hungarian population tolerates a high level of cognitive dissonance; Hungarians are 
proud of being European and support Hungary’s EU membership, but they are also ready to 
blame the EU for the country’s socio-economic and political malaise. Fidesz has produced Janus-
faced narratives attacking the EU and defending Europe. Calls for a “freedom fight against the 
EU” defined populists’ slogans in Hungary during the Orbán governments, which have become 
the model cases illustrating the increase in populism in ECE. In the speech Orbán delivered 
on Hungary’s national holiday, 15 March 2016, Orbán—in the spirit of Eupopulism—extended 
15  Actually, in the 2000s Fidesz and Jobbik were close allies. Jobbik organized aggressive and violent street 
demonstrations, and Fidesz tacitly, behind the scenes, and indirectly supported them: “While street violence 
in the evenings was at its height in Budapest, Fidesz was calling mass demonstrations in Budapest during the 
afternoons . . . Throughout these days the reluctance of Fidesz to distance itself from rioters or from street riots 
was prevalent, with a well pronounced right-radical-right leaning” (Uitz, 2008, pp. 61-62).
16  Viktor Orbán has been the central figure of Hungarian populism and his most resonant declarations have 
voiced his support for “illiberal democracy” and “the decline of the West,” (2014,2015). After autocracy was 
elected, there was a great deal of reflection on Orbán in the media, see for instance Benner and Reinicke (2014), 
Bouillette (2014), Müller (2015), Nowak (2014), and The Economist (2014b). Orbán has been presented in the 
international press as the most important anti-EU actor in the refugee crisis, as “dictator light”, and as the model 
of divergence from European solidarity (on Orbán’s role as a “troublemaker” in the refugee crisis see EPC, 2016).
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a black-and-white populist model of the deep divide between the interests of the innocent 
people and the interests of the impotent elite, from the domestic level to the EU level. Orbán 
emphasized that the European population had fallen victim to the irresponsible EU elite’s 
mishandling of the refugee crisis, and he offered himself as a protector of the victimised 
European population (Orbán, 2016).17
Populist strategies are working well in elections and usually opt for slogans over programs; 
for instance Fidesz’s so-called electoral program, conceived in 2010, was a populist holy trinity: 
“work, family and order” (Fidesz, 2010). After winning the 2010 and 2014 elections, according 
to the operational logic of ruling populist elites, Fidesz drastically restricted the legitimate 
participation of political rivals in the public and political sectors by using legal-political, economic-
financial, and media instruments to strictly limit the actions of other political parties, political 
actors, and civil organizations. After the “octroy,” imposed upon the constitution in 2011—given 
manipulated electoral law and a captured media, Fidesz neglected to even concoct a populist 
electoral program. Instead, in 2014, the party simply declared “we continue.” The soft power 
of populist narratives had worked very well during the party’s governance. Fidesz’s narrative 
technique served to deepen the polarization of society, in which the socio-cultural frames 
of identity issues have replaced or derailed economic arguments about the pauperization of 
Hungarian society in the early 2010s.18
In the Hungarian case, the traditional return-to-history scenario instead of a modern return-
to-Europe scenario represents a basic populist soft-power narrative technique: reinventing the 
past. As the title of the article in the Financial Times by Norweigian minister Vidar Helgesen 
(2014), indicates, the Orbán government’s rule is indeed “Hungary’s journey back into past.” 
ECE’s common narratives are best illustrated by Fidesz’s national-nativist and anti-European 
narratives. The narratives reveal how public discourse is blanketed in historical myths that point 
to Trianon (the peace treaty signed after WWI in which Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory) 
as the main source of Hungary’s national trauma. Fidesz—and the even more the extreme-
right Jobbik—is warning the people of a second Trianon, instigated by Hungary’s domestic and 
international enemies in the EU. This age-old nativist narrative, retold by Fidesz, is a  politicized 
myth—a fairy tale of Great Hungary and a history that never was—based on a nineteenth-
century type of national mythology (Ádám and Bozóki, 2011). In the international arena, Fidesz’s 
narratives try to create a nativist-nationalist collective identity of Hungarians countering their 
strong European identity. At the same time, Fidesz wages value wars domestically; by redefining 
17  In his speech on 15 March 2016, a national holiday celebrating the 1848 revolution, Orbán called Hungarians 
to defend the sovereignty of Hungary against the EU. Nonetheless, according to Eurobarometer, 69 per cent of 
Hungarians declare a European identity, a number above the EU average of 64 per cent (2015, p. 32).
18  There has been a strong continuity in Fidesz’s political discourse since the 2000s: “The party which has 
consistently relied on populist rhetoric . . . is Fidesz . . . Hungarian public discourse has been captured by issues 
and rhetorical methods produced by populist-issue manufacturers. As a result, serious deliberation on other 
matters of public concern is replaced by rhetorical fireworks, display of symbols and empty slogans” (Uitz, 2008, 
p. 40). As an illustration of empty democracy, Fidesz has presented the results of the national consultations in 
the media as vox populi, although the return rate of letters has been very low and these processes have been 
neither transparent nor independently controlled.
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social divisions as cultural divides, the party creates two groups: 1) loyal followers, cast as true 
believers and patriots and; 2) enemies and political opponents, cast as traitors.19
Within this polarized Orwellian world of simplistic answers, Fidesz has successfully staged a 
democracy capture, and to a great extent, a language capture, by dominating public discourse 
with its slogans and terms. All public institutions have been named national and fake so-called 
national consultations have replaced the democratic decision-making process. So far, the soft 
power of words—a childish, oversimplified language in politics such as “Only Fidesz,” “One 
camp, one flag,” “Hungary is successful,” and “Hungary performs better”—and the soft power 
of manipulating or manufacturing data has worked well. The fragmented democratic parties 
have been unable to fight either the hard or soft power of Fidesz. Both mass intimidation, as 
a proxy for hard repression in an emptied democracy without checks and balances, and soft 
repression, with its aggressive agenda setting in the government-manipulated media, has worked 
well so far with the so-called Hungarian patient (Krasztev and van Til, 2015).
CONCLUSION: INCREASING POPULISM IN ECE POSES A SERIOUS CHALLENGE 
TO THE EU
The present success of populist parties in ECE refutes the idea that populists can only be 
successful in opposition and refutes the notion that populists cannot govern and are bound to 
fail when they are in power and have to deliver. At least, in this transitory period of the EU’s 
“polycrisis” (Juncker), ECE’s populist governments are not only successful, they demonstrate the 
systemic failure of a cohesive Europe by highlighting Europe’s increasing core-periphery divide. 
Orbán’s populist regime has contaminated the EU and contributed to “the rise of dystopian 
nationalist regimes . . . The recent victory of the conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party in 
Poland confirms a recent trend in Europe, the rise of illiberal state capitalism led by populist 
right-wing authoritarians . . . the popularity of populist, anti-EU, anti-migrant right-wing parties 
is on the rise” (Roubini, 2015, pp. 1-3). In Hungary’s latest wave of mass demonstrations, a 
popular student slogan announced on the molinos, “We are the first generation brought up in 
democracy. We do not want to be the last.” 
Former EU High Representative Catherine Ashton declared on 15 September 2011, the 
International Day of Democracy, “While democracy is the cornerstone of the European Union, 
it is clear that there is no single model for democratic government” (Ashton, 2011). But where 
are the borders of democracy’s variations? Populist facades of democracy and their changing 
forms, from soft populism to hard populism with the emerging velvet dictatorships, certainly 
do not fit with any variation of European democracy. Just to the contrary, populism is the main 
enemy of European democracy and should be defeated in ECE.20
19  The hegemonic position of Fidesz in the media has been one of the most discussed topics in Hungarian 
populism. According to experts’ estimates, Fidesz controls about 90 per cent of the media, with some free islands 
in Budapest and other main cities, but it has complete control of the media where the large part of the population 
lives. In a 2015 special issue of The Journal of Democracy, Kagan makes a special reference to Hungarian leaders 
who “crack down on press and political freedom” (2015, p. 29).
20  The fact that after the failed catching-up process, and under the pressure of the refugee crisis, the Visegrád 
Four (V4) states united in an unholy alliance in the EU to form a new kind of regional cooperation in ECE could 
be the topic of another paper (see Ágh, 2016c,d).
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